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a life sentence would mean life without parole, defense counsel should there will be further appellate review and well constructed arguments
continue to make the record on this issue through voir dire and proposed may eventually succeed in Federal court. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger,
jury instructions. 481 U.S. 393 (1987), Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 104 (1982).
The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently rejected constitu-
tional objections to the application of the capital statute. Defense counsel Summary and analysis by:
must continue to raise meritorious constitutional challenges, because Peter Hansen
STATE HABEAS IN VIRGINIA: A CRITICAL TRANSITION
BY: CATHERINE M. HOBART
A defendant convicted of capital murder has a statutory right to
post-conviction review of his judgment and sentence.' This statute al-
lows the defendant to petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the circuit
court which entered the original judgment order of conviction. 2 An
evidentiary hearing may be granted in response to the petition and can
be held at any circuit court within the circuit in which the petition was
filed.3 If the circuit court denies petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, the
defendant may appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.4 The right to
habeas review at both the circuit court level and the Virginia Supreme
Court is a statutory right and is "not a necessary element of due process.
Thus, no due process violation occurs if an appeal is barred."5
In Virginia, as the law stands today, there is no constitutional right
to counsel at the state habeas level. 6 However, there is a statutory en-
titlement in Virginia which permits the appointment of counsel at state
habeas proceedings. 7 The Attorney General's Office does not oppose
these appointments and they are routinely made if a pro se inmate can
raise at least one non-frivolous claim in the habeas petition.
Preparing for state habeas review of a capital conviction is not
simply a paper exercise. Because this is probably the last opportunity to
raise claims regarding the trial process, it is essential for the habeas
attorney to reinvestigate all of the facts regarding the defendant's case.
Upon completion of the reinvestigation, each and every claim of error
that can be found to have existed at trial or on direct review must be
included in the state habeas petition. It is also critically important that
these claims be grounded in federal law as well as applicable state law.'
The Virginia Supreme Court has a restrictive policy regarding the
scope of state habeas review, especially where procedural requirements
have not been met. Habeas courts will almost always refuse to hear
claims that are procedurally defaulted or which have already been
decided on their merits. For this and other reasons, state habeas relief is
almost never granted. Yet, it is a critical transition stage to federal
review. Therefore, regardless of their potential for success, all claims
must be raised in the state habeas petition.
Reinvestigation is also important because it may uncover facts
whichcouldultimately meritreliefandovertum aconvictionorsentence.
Further, there are circumstances and exceptions under federal law that
may allow claims to be heard on their merits despite the fact that they are
defaulted under state law. There are many reasons supporting the same
conclusion: All claims must be included in the state habeas petition.
In addition to raising all state claims, any claims which the
defendant wishes to raise at federal habeas must also be raised in the state
habeas petition. This is necessary for two reasons. First, 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) requires that all state remedies be exhausted before a federal
habeas corpus petition can be granted. "The doctrine of exhaustion of
state remedies is satisfied if the same claim raised in a federal habeas
proceeding has been presented previously before the highest state court,
either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding."9 Second, a
federal claim which is not properly raised in the state system will be
procedurally defaulted. A finding of procedural default at the state
habeas level will usually bar review at the federal habeas level. In
Wainwright v. Sykes,'0 the Supreme Court held that a state finding of
procedural default would bar federal habeas review unless both 'cause'
excusing the default and 'prejudice' resulting from non-review could be
shown. Smith v. Baker," stated that the procedural bar would be upheld
on federal habeas if, "the State procedural rule serves an adequate State
interest.., and the rule has been reasonably applied."'
2
State habeas claims can be said to fall into three categories. Those
which have been procedurally defaulted, those which have already been
decided on direct review and those new claims which could only have
been broughtbefore the court atthe state habeas level. Abriefexplanation
of case law in each of these categories will facilitate an understanding of
why so few claims actually receive state habeas consideration on their
merits.
A. Claims Which Were Not Raised at the State Trial Level
In Slayton v. Parrigan,3 a prisoner convicted of robbery claimed
in his state habeas petition that his in-court identification by the victim
"was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification."' 4
The petitioner had failed to raise this claim during trial and on direct
appeal. The Virginia Supreme Court held that "[a] prisoneris not entitled
to use habeas corpus to circumvent the trial and appellate processes for
an inquiry into an alleged non-jurisdictional defect of a judgment of
conviction."'" Therefore, it is extremely important to object to all
potential constitutional violations during trial 6 and further, to raise those
issues on direct appeal.17 Failure to do so may bar the claims from ever
receiving habeas review.
B. Claims Decided On Their Merits On Direct Review
In Hawks v. Cox,8 a prisoner attempted to raise claims in a state
habeas petition which were the subject of previous adverse judicial
rulings. The Virginia Supreme Court held that a "previous determination
of the issues by either state or federal courts will be conclusive."' 9 Thus,
whenever claims have been decided on their merits by the Virginia
Supreme Court on direct appeal, the Attorney General will argue that
Hawks controls and that the claims should be dismissed. It may fre-
quently be argued in response, however, that the Virginia Supreme
Court's denial of the claims was based only on a determination that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the ruling, rather than
a determination that the trial court made the proper ruling. If that is the
case, the statehabeas court will notviolateHawks by reviewing the claims.
In any event, claims dismissed on Hawks grounds are properly ex-
hausted and preserved for federal habeas review.
C. Claims Which Could Only Be Raised At State Habeas
Because of the holdings in Hawks and Parrigan, the only claims
likely to be decided at state habeas are those which could not be raised
until after the trial and direct appeal stages were completed. The most
common of these claims are those arising from the ineffective assistance
of counsel, Brady 2" violations, and prosecutorial, judicial or law en-
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forcement misconduct. By theirnature, these claims could nothave been
raised prior to habeas review. Consequently, they are not subject to
procedural default at the state habeas level.
In order to be successful on habeas review, each of these claims
must be fully supported with facts. Therefore, the habeas attorney must
reinvestigate the entire case to discover and develop a factual basis for
each claim.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The sixth amendment guarantees all criminal defendants the
effective assistance of counsel. 21 In order to prove a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel:
[T]he defendant must [first] show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the sixth amendment. Second, the
defendantmust show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.Y
Because ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on the
trial counsel's deficient performance and the prejudicial effect that
performance had on the defendant's case, a full investigation must be
made in order to reveal the reasons why the trial attorney "employed or
did not employ a particular trial tactic.'* 3 This includes finding out what
counsel knew, when she knew it and what she would have known if a
proper investigation had been completed.' "The ordinary trial record is
not developed adequately to permit on direct appeal a fair resolution of
questions involving ineffective assistance. '27 Rather, a record reflecting
the theory behind counsel's actions must be developed for the habeas
court's review. Thus, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could
not have properly been raised on direct appeal.
Common errors of counsel in capital cases include a failure to
investigate and present a case in mitigation and a failure to follow state
procedural rules. Properly investigating a defendant's character, back-
ground and the circumstances of the particular offense, is necessary to
the presentation of a case in mitigation.26 In Lockett v. Ohio27 the Su-
preme Court held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require
individualized consideration of any and all mitigating factors the defen-
dant wishes to present to thejury.Lockett and subsequent cases establish
that a defendanthas the opportunity to develop a theory of mitigation and
presentevidence whichmay help the sentencerunderstandthe defendant's
actions. There are vitually no limits on the type of evidence the defendant
can present to the sentencer. Therefore, a trial attorney can make a full
investigation into the defendant's background and history, develop a
theory of mitigation, and support that theory with- facts from his
investigation. If the trial attorney does not adequately investigate a case
and fails to uncover facts in a defendant's background which would have
a mitigating effect on his sentence, then counsel has not been effective
in his representation of the defendant. Tactical decisions by trial counsel
are not constitutionally deficient, even if wrong. However, the decisions
must be made on adequate information regarding the defendant's case.
Only an investigation by habeas counsel will reveal what information
the trial counsel was aware of at the time he made his tactical decisions.
If adecision was not supportedby adequate information, under Strickland,
a claim can be made that counsel's performance was not only deficient,
but that his errors prejudiced the defense.
If counsel fails to follow state procedural rules, a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel can be offered under Wainwright v. Sykes,
supra, as the reason for the failure. Sykes held that afinding of procedural
default at the state level will bar federal habeas review unless both
"cause" excusing the default and "prejudice" resulting from non-review
could be shown. In Justus v. Murray,7 the petitioner failed to raise cer-
tain claims on direct appeal. In his state habeas petition, petitioner
claimed that his failure to appeal the claims was due to ineffective
assistance of counsel. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
rejected and the claims were found to be procedurally barred. Petitioner
appealed the state habeas court's decision to the Virginia Supreme
Court, but failed to separately raise the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. When a second petition was filed raising these claims, the
Virginia Supreme Court found them to be procedurally defaulted.
Consequently, the petitioner was found to have "procedurally defaulted
on both the substance of his remaining claims as well as the ineffective
assistance of counsel claims he offered in state court as cause to excuse
the substantive defaults. ' 29 The Fourth Circuit termed this a double
default. 0 On federal habeas review, the Fourth Circuit held thatreviewing
"the merits of appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims as
cause for the defaults on direct appeal.., would, contrary to Sykes and
our prior precedents, circumvent the state procedural bar.
3'
Despite the contrary holding in Justus, counsel's failure to comply
with state rules should always constitute "cause" under Sykes because a
defendant should not be penalized for his counsel's deficient perfor-
mance.32 This is not always true, however, because failure to raise a
claim does not alone render counsel's performance deficient enough to
meet the ineffective assistance of counsel standard set forth in Strickland.
It is arguable that the "Strickland/Sykes" gap should narrow as the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court decisions make it clear that following procedural
rules is abasic part oflawyering at the trial level.33 There is an abundance
of cases which clearly set forth state procedural requirements and there
should be no excuse for counsel's failure to comply with state rules. In
addition, prejudice will have occurred because a claim which may have
had the potential to overturn a death sentence or a conviction will not be
allowed to be heard at federal habeas. Therefore, habeas counsel should
continue to claim that trial counsel's deficient performance constitutes
"cause" under Sykes.
2. Brady Violations
According to Brady v. Maryland, "the suppression by the pros-
ecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." The
prosecutor does not have to have actual knowledge of the existence of
Brady materials before his obligation is triggered.35 As long as the ex-
culpatory evidence is in the possession of the police, the prosecutor has
constructive knowledge of the Brady materials and must give the in-
formation to the defendant.
36
In Giglio v. United States,37 the Supreme Court held that Brady
requires any evidence that would impeach the credibility of a govern-
ment witness to be disclosed to the defense. Thus, ifa defendant can find
exculpatory or impeachment information that was in the constructive
possession of the police, and can show that the information may have
effected the outcome at either the guilt or penalty phase of the trial, he
will have grounds for a new trial, or a new sentencing hearing. Further,
in light of the expanded scope of information relevant to a case in
mitigation, it is very likely that Brady violations will occur in a capital
trial. For example, there are bound to be statements, favorable to the case
in mitigation, resulting from the many interviews which occur between
the police and witnesses who have known the defendant. Consequently,
it is essential that the habeas attorney reinvestigate the case to determine
what evidence was in the possession of the Commonwealth and what
evidence was turned over to the defendant.
3. Prosecutorial, Judicial and Police Misconduct
Government misconduct occurring throughout the trial can be so
fundamentally unfair as to violate constitutional rights. Therefore, all the
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actors involved in the process leading up to a criminal conviction must
be reinvestigated in order to uncover evidence of misconduct that may
have the potential to overturn a conviction or sentence. Some examples
of due process violations resulting from government misconduct are
found in cases relating to discovery, entrapment and the right to a speedy
trial.
During the early development of discovery law, courts gave relief
to defendants based on the conduct of the prosecutors. In Mooney v.
Holohan,38 the Supreme Court held that deliberate deception of a court
and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence constitutes a due
process violation. Later, in Napue v. Illinois,39 the Court held that a due
process violation would also occur "when the State, although not
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears."4
In the area of entrapment, although a defendant's "predisposition
to commit a crime will bar application of an entrapment defense,
fundamental fairness will not permit any defendant to be convicted of a
crime in which police conduct was outrageous." 4' Therefore, a due
process violation will occur when the nature and extent of police
involvement in a crime "is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction."42
Similarly, the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial does
not apply to preindictment delay, however,
mhe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
would require dismissal of the indictment if it were
shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay...
caused substantial prejudice to... [the defendant's]
rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an
intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over
the accused 3
Courts have also found that a prosecutor's misconduct can consti-
tute "cause" underSykes so as to excuse counsel's procedural default. In
the recent case of Amadeo v. Zant,4 the District Attorney's Office
concealed a memorandum designed to intentionally cause
underrepresentation of blacks and women on juries. The concealment of
the memorandum was uncovered during habeas reinvestigation. The
Supreme Court held, if the "memorandum was not reasonably discov-
erable because it was concealed by... officials, and if that concealment,
rather than tactical considerations, was the reason for the failure of
petitioner's lawyers to raise the jury challenge in the trial court, then
petitioner established ample cause to excuse his procedural default."45
Habeas courts will sometimes review state and federal claims that
were technically procedurally defaulted, if the defaultwas brought about
by misconduct. Further, real prosecutorial misconduct that rises to the
level of a due process violation entitles a defendant to relief without a
showing of prejudice under Sykes. For this reason, reinvestigating
prosecutorial, judicial and law enforcement conduct is a necessity.
Thus, when claims could not have been raised prior to the state
habeas level and non-review would constitute an injustice upon the
defendant, the habeas courts may still decide to review those claims.
Upon denial of a state habeas petition by the circuit court, every
single claim that was denied under the three categories of habeas claims
must be separately appealed back to the Virginia Supreme Court or they
may not be considered at federal habeas review. If this procedure is not
followed, any claims which up to this point were properly preserved for
federal habeas review may be denied review due to procedural default.
Further, a federal habeas court has the discretion to hear a state claim if
the state court has not unambiguously rejected the claims on adequate
and independent state grounds. Thus, the defendant may still have the
chance to overturn his conviction or sentence on state or federal grounds
if he has separately appealed those claims to the Virginia Supreme Court.
1. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654 (1984).
2. Id.
3.Id.
4. Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-654, 17-110.1 (1988).
5. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460,357 S.E.2d 500 (1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987).
6. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989), cert. denied,
1990 WL 59769 (1990).
7. Va. Code Ann. § 14.1-183 (1989).
8. See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in
Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
9. Cartera v. Mitchell, 553 F. Supp. 866, 869 (E.D. Va. 1982).
10. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
11. 624 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1985).
12. Id. at 1077, 1078.
13. 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1108 (1975).
14. Id. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682.
15. Id. at 30, 205 S.E.2d at 682.
16. Rule 5:25 of the Supreme Court of Virginia requires that
objections be stated with reasonable certainty at the time of ruling.
17. Rule 5:27(e) of the Supreme Court of Virginia requires that
all assignments of error be briefed on appeal.
18. 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970)
19. Id. at 95, 175 S.E.2d at 274.
20. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
21. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Habeas counsel should seek appointment of expert witnesses
to show the habeas court what the trial attorney could have done,
especially in regard to mitigating evidence. For further discussion of
the legal and operational aspects of these claims, see Note, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 Stan L. Rev. 461
(1987); Goodpaster, The TrialforLife:EffectiveAssistance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299 (1983).
25. Walker v. Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 570-571, 299 S.E.2d 698,
699 (1983).
26. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
27. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
28. 897 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1990).
29. Id. at 712.
30. Id.
31. Id.,at 713. For further discussion onJustus v. Murray, please
refer to case summary of Justus v. Murray, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
32. In Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 1988), the Court
found that Stephens' ineffective assistance of counsel claim as excuse
for default satisfied both the cause and prejudice prong of Sykes and,
therefore, federal habeas review was not barred.
33. See Whitleyv.Bair, 802F.2d 1487 (4thCir. 1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1034 (1989), where Fourth Circuit upheld district court's
determination that fifteen of petitioner's claims made in the various
appeals and habeas proceedings had been procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner made a total of seventy-one claims of error, however, he did
not appeal all of them to the Fourth Circuit. See also, Powley, Per-
fecting the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue, at note 29, for further examples.
34. 373 U.S. at 87.
35. See Fitzgerald v. Bass, 6 Va. App. 38, 366 S.E.2d 615 (Va.
App. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 354 (1989).
36.Id.
37. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
38. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
39. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
40. Id. at 269.
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41. United States v. Twiggs, 588 F.2d 373, 378-79 (1978). 43. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
42. Id. at 377 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,431- 44. 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
32 (1973)). 45. Id. at 222.
PERFECTING THE RECORD OF A CAPITAL CASE IN VIRGINIA
BY: ROBERT L. POWLEY
In a capital case, the record must reflect all legal positions at issue
pretrial and during trial in order to allow later reviewing courts to
consider possible errors. The Virginia Supreme Court will not consider
any legal issue not preserved on the record, and will consider the claim
waived. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25 states, "Error will not be
sustained to any ruling of the trial court or the commission before which
the case was initially tried unless the objection was stated with reasonable
certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to
enable this Court to attain the ends of justice." Furthermore, federal
courts will ordinarily not consider any issues that were waived on state
procedural grounds.' In accordance with United States Supreme Court
Rule 21(h), on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Court will only
consider those federal claims which were timely and properly raised in
state court. Therefore, making and preserving all legal issues on the
record is essential for any appeal. The attorney for the defendant must
object to every error on the record, and state the grounds for that
objection. This article will serve as a guide for successfully making and
preserving the record in a capital case for direct appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court in a manner that will also permit later review by federal
courts.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR PRESERVING
THE RECORD IN VIRGINIA
In a capital case, all motions and objections must be made on
federal constitutional grounds, specifically the sixth, eighth and fourteenth
amendments in addition to any state law grounds. Unlike a non-capital
case, a capital case resulting in a death sentence will almost certainly be
offered for federal review. The reviewing federal court will consider
only those issues which are preserved on the record on federal grounds.
The United States Supreme Court has held that death is qualitatively
different from any other penalty, and that difference calls for a corre-
sponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case.2 The Court has,
on occasion, been faithful to this principle. It is not possible to determine
whether this requirement of "super due process" will be recognized in
any given trial. It is therefore arguable that any state law, procedure, or
ruling at trial that undermines the increased procedural reliability
required in a capital case is violative of federal law. Morespecific federal
issues arise from sixth amendment rights to effective assistance of
counsel, a fair and impartial jury, and the right to put on evidence.
The need for heightened reliability in a capital case can give rise
to many issues that would not ordinarily be recognized as federal in a
non-capital case, especially during pretrial and the penalty phase. For
example, the denial of a continuance may unlawfully burden the sixth
amendment right to counsel and compulsory process. Likewise, the jury
selection procedures of the Circuit Court, including denial of motions for
change of venue and restrictions on voir dire, implicate the sixth
amendment guarantee of a fair and impartial jury, and the record must
reflect this. Any restrictions on the presentation of evidence and on cross
examination should be objected to on due process grounds.3 In Green v.
Georgia,4 the exclusion of evidence at the sentencing phase based upon
Georgia's hearsay rule was held unconstitutional under the heightened
eighth amendment due process rationale.
There are many other aspects of this discreet capital jurisprudence
that it is necessary to learn in order to recognize and present issues on
federal grounds. Consequently, in preparation for a capital case it
becomes necessary as a minimum to read all United States Supreme
Court capital decisions since 1976, and all Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals capital decisions. In addition, all Supreme Court of Virginia
capital decisions should be read both in order to understand state law,
and to learn of those areas in which the court's rulings may not comport
with federal requirements. At the Virginia Capital Case Clearing House,
we call the process of grounding every motion, objection, proposed
instruction, proffer, etc. in the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments
"federalization". Federalization is absolutely essential to obtain mean-
ingful federal review of trial errors.
Objections should not be made without stating the legal position
in the trial court "with reasonable certainty." 5 The objection should be
supported on specific legal grounds, yet inclusive of as many grounds as
possible, especially federal grounds. This is very important for the
purposes of Rule 5:25 because the trial court must be given every
opportunity to rule intelligently on objections in order to avoid unnec-
essary appeals, reversals and mistrials.6 Furthermore, this will ensure
that on appeal the reviewing court will have as many grounds as possible
to rule favorably.
In an effort to state legal positions "with reasonable certainty,"
evidence should be presented in support of the position whenever
possible. This is especially true when there is an adverse ruling that
disallows a defense question or defense evidence. The defense should
proffer the answer to the question or the evidence. The proffer of
evidence or testimony preserves the issues on the record for review on
appeal. The information can be proffered in three ways. First, by an
unchallenged unilateral avowal of counsel. Second, by stipulation of
what the rejected evidence would be, or third, the testimony or evidence
could be put on the record in the absence of the jury.7
PRETRIAL CONSIDERATIONS
All pretrial motions must be in writing and must state with
particularity the grounds upon which they are based 8 The grounds for
the motions must always contain federal constitutional claims, as well as
any state law claims. Again, "federalization" of all motions is crucial to
preserving the legal position for appeal.
The following motions must be made pretrial. Discovery is
regulated under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:l 1, and under Rule
3A: 11 (d), and the motion mustbe made at least ten (10) days before trial.
Any defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the
prosecution, or in the indictment(s) must be made before the plea is
entered and at least seven (7) days before the trial." Examples of defenses
and objections based on defects include eighth amendment objections to
the death penalty in general and the Virginia capital statute, double
jeopardy issues, vindictive or selective prosecution issues, a motion for
a bill of particulars, speedy trial issues, and challenges to the selection
of the grand jury. Finally, motions to suppress must be made at least
seven (7) days before trial.'0 Failure to present any such defense or
objection will be considered an effective waiver. Jurisdictional issues
and failure of the written charge to state an offense can be made to the
court any time during the pendency of the proceeding.
